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ABSTRACT 
We study the output costs of 40 systemic banking crises since 1980. Most, but not all, crises in our 
sample coincide with a sharp contraction in output from which it took several years to recover. Our 
main findings are as follows. First, the current financial crisis is unlike any others in terms of a wide 
range of economic factors. Second, the output losses of past banking crises were higher when they 
were accompanied by a currency crisis or when growth was low at the onset of the crisis. When accompanied 
by a sovereign debt default, a systemic banking crisis was less costly. And, third, there is a tendency 
for systemic banking crises to have lasting negative output effects. 
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1. Introduction 
August 2009 marks the second anniversary of the start of the first global financial crisis of the 
21
st century. World output has experienced its sharpest drop since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, with most economies contracting in late 2008 and early 2009. The severity of the 
crisis has surprised nearly everyone. But some of the causes of the financial implosion have 
been noted for some time. For example, as early as 1986, there were warnings about the 
tendency of new financial instruments to be underpriced.
1 And, more recently there were 
concerns about the dangers of asset price bubbles and credit booms.
2 Detailed 
investigations into exactly what went wrong will surely occupy at least one generation of 
researchers. 
Our objective here is not to explain the causes of the current crisis. Instead we study the 
consequences. To do that, we examine the evolution of the real costs of financial crises to 
get some sense of when things are likely to improve. 
Banking crises have plagued the world for centuries, leaving virtually no region or generation 
untouched.
3  But while they may be quite common, financial crises also tend to be quite 
diverse. Initial conditions are different; industrial and institutional structures are different; 
levels of development are different; degrees of openness are different; policy frameworks are 
different; and external conditions are different. The fact that crises are, in the words of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), “an equal opportunity menace” makes designing appropriate 
policy responses extraordinarily challenging.  
Policymaking is about numbers – namely, about the magnitude and timing of reactions to 
adjustments in policy settings. A 100 basis point change in the interest rate or a fiscal 
stimulus amounting to 1 percentage point of GDP will influence growth and inflation, but by 
how much? And what is the timing of the impact? These questions, and many more like 
them, are central to policymaking. And they can be answered only by looking at historical 
experience. Thus, doing the statistical analysis requires data that come from an environment 
similar to the one we face today. Difficult in normal, tranquil times, relying on history to 
predict the likely evolution of the economy after a crisis is even worse. 
In our view, making any progress at all requires separating the ordinary from the 
extraordinary. We believe that it is not possible to study crisis times by looking at models 
1  See the introduction in BIS (1986). 
2  See Crockett (2000) 
3  Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) report that, over the past two centuries, the 66 countries they study have experienced 286 
banking crisis, 105 of which have come since 1945.  On average, countries have been in crisis for roughly one year out of 
every 12.  
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estimated during normal times. Economic behaviour is inherently nonlinear, so the linear 
approximation of existing empirical models is likely to be very inaccurate.
4 
Turning to the question at hand, we study crises and the related contractions in the real 
economy, restricting our analysis to the period identified in this way. That means several 
things. First, we sort the data before studying it. Second, we look at the tails of the 
distribution – crises are (relatively) infrequent. Third, we look for commonality among the 
crises we study – assuming that some exist. And finally, we conduct an entirely empirical 
analysis – studying data, not theoretical models. Moreover, throughout our analysis, we 
make no attempt to characterise the circumstances under which a crisis is likely to occur; 
instead, we condition our entire analysis on the fact that a crisis exists.
5 
We use information on 40 crises in 35 countries since 1980 to study the length, depth and 
output costs of systemic banking crises. First, we discuss the mechanisms that seem to be at 
work in transmitting the financial sector disturbances to the real economy. Next, we present 
the data and then group the crises, looking for similarities. This initial look at the data leads 
us to conclude that (1) most, but not all, systemic banking crises coincide with a sharp 
contraction in output from which it takes several years to recover, and (2) the current 
financial crisis is unlike any others in the dataset. That second point means that simply 
averaging outcomes of past crises to get a reading on the current one is likely to be 
misleading regardless of the sample or subsample. 
With this in mind we go on to study the determinants of the output losses from past crises – 
initial conditions, financial structure, level of development, policy reactions, and external 
conditions. Our findings suggest that the costs are higher when the banking crisis is 
accompanied by a currency crisis or when growth is low immediately before the onset of the 
crisis. Furthermore, when it is accompanied by a sovereign debt default, a systemic banking 
crisis is less costly. Our multivariate estimates suggest that some of the main economies 
affected by the crisis will regain their pre-crisis levels of output by the second half of 2010 
(but the confidence interval around this prediction is large!). 
The final part of the paper takes a longer-term view and studies the impact of crises on 
potential output several years down the road. Cerra and Saxena (2008) show that financial 
crises tend to have permanent effects on output, which are not taken into account in 
standard estimates of the costs of crises. Our results are consistent with this, as we find that 
many systemic banking crises have had lasting negative effects on the level of GDP. And 
4 Even if we were to ignore the problems caused by linearisation, we would have no way of reliably choosing among existing 
models. The reason is that they are all the same in one important way: they all go through the mean of the data. This means 
that when they are the most accurate, they are all the same. And when they are not the same, they are inaccurate and their 
implications are driven by their assumptions.  
5 For a discussion of vulnerabilities that help to predict the onset of a crisis, see Borio and Drehmann (2009). 
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even in those cases in which trend growth was higher after the crisis than it had been before, 
making up for the output loss resulting from the crisis itself took years.  
2.  The channels of crisis transmission 
The current financial crisis has been dramatic, reducing global real activity, trade and 
inflation to a degree unprecedented since World War II. Annual output growth plunged by 
more than 10 percentage points, annual trade volumes contracted more than 30 per cent, 
and consumer prices dropped (Graph 1). What is the mechanism through which the financial 
crisis led to such an extraordinary fall in activity? 
Graph 1 
Global output, trade and consumer prices 

















2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
1  Weighted average using 2005 GDP and PPP weights of: the euro area, Japan and the United States; Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom; China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela; the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland; Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. 
2  First quarter of 2009 partly estimated using forecasts 
from JPMorgan Chase. 
3  Sum of world exports and imports of goods in US dollars divided by unit values. 
Sources: IMF; Bloomberg; Datastream; JPMorgan Chase; national data. 
The simplest way to understand the recent crisis experience is to employ a modified version 
of the framework that has been developed for discussing the channels through which 
monetary policy affects output and prices. Changes in financial conditions – interest rates in 
the case of monetary policy, a much broader set of rates, spreads and asset prices in a crisis 
– affect real activity and inflation both directly and indirectly. 
Table 1 adapts the familiar list of monetary transmission channels to the case of a financial 
crisis. Starting with the cost of funding, with the exception of the safest sovereign assets, 
financial system stress drives up borrowing costs.  During the past two years, even though 
policy rates were falling, the cost of private credit (when it was available) was increasing. In 
the United States, for example, interest rates on both conventional 30-year mortgages and 
triple-A long-term bonds rose more than 100 basis points even as the federal funds rate fell 
400 basis points. Declining equity prices worldwide also sharply raised the cost of obtaining 
funding through the stock market.  
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Table 1: Connecting the financial system to the real economy 
Channel Mechanism 
Funding costs  Higher interest rates, higher spreads and lower equity prices 
increase funding costs, reducing investment 
Credit availability  Tighter financial conditions reduce banks’ and other financial 
institutions’ willingness to lend 
Risk aversion  Higher risk aversion drives up risk premia and leads to flights to 
quality 
Firms’ net worth  Lower equity and property prices drive down firms’ net worth, 
increasing the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
Household net worth  Lower equity and property prices reduce individuals’ net worth, 
worsening creditworthiness, making borrowing more difficult 
Exchange rates  Flight to “safe haven” currencies, and reversals of capital flows, 
affect exchange rates, which have trade effects 
Confidence  Consumer, business and investor confidence fall leading to a 
curtailing of their activities 
Higher funding costs raise the threshold rate of return, driving down investment. And higher 
market rates, if they increase servicing costs on existing debt, could drain funds for new 
investment as well. This is a likely outcome in a number of countries, as a sizable proportion 
of corporate borrowing takes the form of revolving short-term loans or fixed-term loans with 
variable rates. In addition, in a number of countries increases in short-term interest rates 
affect households directly through adjustments in required mortgage payments. All of this 
suggests that tighter financial conditions are likely to reduce both corporate profits and 
households’ disposable income. 
Not only did the crisis raise the cost of borrowing, it also reduced the availability of credit both 
through the traditional lending channel and through securitisation. While the evidence 
concerning the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in 
normal times is mixed,
6 it is widely accepted that disruptions in the financial system curtail 
the supply of credit directly. During the current crisis, for example, banks (in countries for 
which we have surveys) have tightened lending standards sharply.
7 While the demand for 
credit has also declined, this has surely contributed to the reduced quantity of lending to the 
non-bank private sector we have observed. Beyond this, a number of non-bank lenders have 
6 Kashyap and Stein (2000) found that monetary policy has a stronger impact on small US banks, a result they interpret as 
evidence for a bank lending channel. In contrast, research covering the euro area in the early 2000s (summarised in 
Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003)) finds more mixed evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel. 
7 Exceptions include China, where anecdotal evidence suggests that banks have loosened credit standards as part of the 
government’s stimulus packages. 
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simply disappeared, victims of the crisis. And the collapse of securitisation has reduced loan 
supply even further. 
Contributing to both the increase in funding costs and the decline in credit supply has been 
the sharp rise in investors’ risk aversion through 2008 (Graph 2).
8 At the height of the crisis, 
institutional investors appeared reluctant to hold almost any type of risky asset, although, 
again, it is debatable whether prices were too high or whether there was a genuine reduction 
in the supply of funding. 
Turning to balance sheets, declines in stock and real estate prices (but also in prices for 
other assets, such as used machinery) had a direct impact on corporate net worth, reducing 
the quantity of collateral firms had available to back loans  
Graph 2
Indicators of investor appetite: investor surveys 
Merrill Lynch global fund manager survey of risk level
1  Gallup index of (retail) investor optimism
2 
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1  Net balance of respondents taking on a riskier investment strategy relative to their benchmark, in per cent. 
2  Based on interviews of 
no fewer than 1,000 US investors with at least $10,000 of investable assets. The index had a baseline score of 124 when it was
established in October 1996.
Sources: Gallup; Merrill Lynch.
The sharp drop in equity prices globally and in property prices in some countries has had a 
an impact through households’ balance sheets on their spending and saving. Graph 3 shows 
the dramatic fall in household wealth as a fraction of disposable income. In the United States, 
the decline was roughly 25 per cent while in the euro area this measure of household 
balance sheet strength fell 10 per cent and in the United Kingdom the drop was a more 
modest 5 per cent. 
Measures of risk that are based on the volatilities that are implied by options prices show a similar pattern. 
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Graph 3
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1  Estimates of 2008 net wealth based on changes in net worth (excluding revaluation of residential property). 
2  Estimates of 2008
net wealth based on changes in net worth due to gross saving and capital transfers. 
Sources: ECB; Federal Reserve flow of funds accounts; Datastream; UK Office for National Statistics; national data. 
The details of the mechanism through which wealth affects consumption is a matter of some 
debate. For equities, the logic is clear: a fall in stock prices usually signals deterioration in 
future profitability. Slower growth means lower incomes and fewer resources to devote to 
current (and future) consumption. Equity markets may be fickle, often giving one day and 
taking back the next, but sustained movements really do signal changes in future growth. 
The meaningfulness of the stock signal contrasts with that from falling housing prices. People 
own their homes to hedge the risk arising from potential changes in the price of purchasing 
housing services. They want to make sure that they can continue to live in the same sized 
home. A fall in property prices thus means that people are consuming less housing (in 
nominal terms), not that they are less wealthy. Regardless of the soundness of that 
argument, there is at the very least a channel leading from residential property prices, 
through collateral value, to credit access. Declines in housing prices have a clear impact on 
the health of household balance sheets.  
Beyond these standard wealth and collateral effects, crisis-induced declines in housing 
prices lead individuals to shift from less liquid assets to more liquid financial assets in 
response to increased financial vulnerability. And finally, there is the impact on retirement 
saving that arises from the decline in asset values for individuals in defined contribution 
pension schemes. 
Financial crises affect economic activity through their effect on exchange rates as well. 
Individual countries’ crises often suffer from capital flight, resulting in a depreciation of their 
currency. In the current global crisis, we have also witnessed flight into “safe haven” 
currencies such as the US dollar and the Swiss franc, and capital flow reversals relating to 
portfolio consolidations. As a result, some countries have experienced a considerable 
depreciation of their currency, while others – ironically some of those at the centre of the 
financial crisis, such as the United States and Switzerland – saw their currency appreciate. 
17/09/2009 10:04:21  6    
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Currency movements clearly influence trade, with depreciation tending to provide a stimulus 
and appreciation a break on activity. But it is important to keep in mind that otherwise 
beneficial declines in a country’s currency can have negative effects if there are wide-spread 
currency mismatches in company and household balance sheets. 
Finally, there is the impact on confidence and the effect this has on real activity. Again, the 
impact of the current crisis has been striking. Indicators of consumer and business 
confidence for both the United States and the euro area dropped to their lowest levels in 
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1  Normalised data, measured as the difference between the indicator and its average (since 1980 for the United States, since 1985 for
the euro area), expressed in points of standard deviation. 
2  Shaded areas refer to periods of recession dated by the NBER. 
Sources: Datastream; national data.
Graph 5
Change in real spending 
Consumer durables


























2007  2008  2009  2007  2008  2009 
1  Including semi-durables; for the euro area, proxied by retail sales excluding food; quarterly changes at annual rates, in per 
cent. 
2  Weighted average based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates; changes over 12 months, in per cent.   
3  Contributions, in 
percentage points. 
Source: National data. 
Disentangling the effects of the various channels is difficult if not impossible. But it is also not 
necessary, since all of their outcomes (except for those of the exchange rate in some 
countries) go in the same direction: downwards. The implication of this is clear in Graph 5: in 
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the United States and Japan, households cut their spending on durables by 20 per cent, and 
capital goods orders cumulated to a decline of 40 per cent by the last quarter of 2008. The 
outcome for GDP growth (Graph 1) is thus not surprising. 
3. Examining crises: definitions and comparisons 
Identifying a financial crisis 
Before you can study financial crises, you have to define them. Unfortunately, there is no 
universally agreed definition. Rather than try to establish our own, we turn to Laeven and 
Valencia (2008, p 5), who characterise a systemic banking crisis as events in which 
a country’s corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and 
financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. 
As a result, non-performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate 
banking system capital is exhausted. This situation may be accompanied by depressed 
asset prices … sharp increases in real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in 
capital flows. In some cases, the crisis is triggered by depositor runs on banks, though 
in most cases it is a general realization that systematically important financial 
institutions are in distress. 
This description is similar to that used by Bordo et al (2001), who define a banking crisis as a 
period of “financial stress resulting in the erosion of most or all of aggregate banking system 
capital”, and by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), who define a crisis to be “one of two types of 
events: (i) bank runs that lead to closure, merger or takeover by the public sector of one or 
more financial institutions, (ii) in the absence of runs, closure, merger, takeover or large-
scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that 
marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions”. 
Our empirical work uses the crisis resolution database of Laeven and Valencia (2008). They 
identify 124
9 crises between 1970 and 2007 and collect information on the policies 
implemented during the various stages of 40 crises listed in Table 2.
10 We complement their 
data for these 40 crises with more detailed information on initial conditions and outcomes. 
Crisis resolution tends to be undertaken by national authorities, even if the measures may be 
coordinated on an international level. For this reason, like many other researchers, Laeven 
and Valencia define crises along national boundaries. For example, for 1997 they observe 
separate crises in Thailand, Korea, etc, instead of a single Asian crisis. We follow this 
approach when defining current events. Instead of a global crisis, we focus on crises in eight 
9 This number is far lower than the 187 identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a) over this same period. The source of the 
difference is the definition of a crisis. We note that every crisis in Laeven and Valencia is also in Reinhart and Rogoff. We 
also note that there are cases in which Reinhart and Rogoff identify two crises but the Laeven and Valencia database 
includes only one. See Reinhart and Rogoff  (2008a), p 83.   
10 The 84 crises we drop are primarily in Africa and small emerging market economies elsewhere, as well those in the United 
Kingdom and the United States in 2007. The remaining 40 crises all occurred between 1980 and 2007. 
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Table 2: Financial crises, 1980–2007 
Date Output  loss
 Length  Depth
1, 2  Cumulative loss 
relative to peak
2 
Argentina  03/1980 28  14.1  –44.5 
Argentina  12/1989 9  12.1  –16.2 












Brazil  02/1990 6  11.4  –6.0 
Brazil  12/1994 7  2.5  –1.9 
Bulgaria  01/1996 27  42.3  –129.3 
Chile  11/1981 21  20.2  –60.1 
Colombia  07/1982 0  0.0  0.0 
Colombia  06/1998 14  6.8  –11.8 
Côte d‘Ivoire
3  01/1988 5  0.4  –0.2 
Croatia  03/1998 6  13.5  –8.3 
Czech Republic  01/1996 13  2.7  –5.6 
Dominica  04/2003 8  1.8  –1.8 
Ecuador
3  08/1998 11  6.3  –9.5 























Japan  11/1997 15  3.4  –6.7 
Korea  08/1997 7  9.2  –9.3 
Latvia  04/1995 7  19.6  –14.8 
Lithuania  12/1995 2  0.6  –0.2 























Philippines  07/1997 6  2.7  –2.2 
Russia  08/1998 8  5.3  –5.1 
Sri Lanka
3  01/1989 0  0.0  0.0 
Sweden  09/1991 16  5.8  –11.0 





























Mean  11.4  8.6  –18.4 
Median  8.5  6.6  –9.2 
Standard deviation  8.9  8.7  28.6 
1 Peak to trough decline in GDP; peak defined using four-quarter window before and after the crisis. 
2 In per cent. 
3 Annual 
data. 
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countries: Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United States 
and the United Kingdom. The group includes some of the economies at the heart of the crisis 
as well as some of those whose financial system had arguably been in relatively good shape, 
but which were nevertheless hit by repercussions of the crisis. Instead of assuming that all 
countries were affected at the same time, we allow for variation as to when the crises started. 
We assume that it was first felt in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany in 
August 2007 before it spread to Switzerland (in October 2007, when UBS issued its first 
profit warning) and, in October 2008, to the other four countries.
11 
Real losses arising from financial crises 
Having settled on a list of crises, the next task is to characterise the real losses associated 
with each one. There are two possibilities: the fiscal costs of resolution or the output costs, 
relative to some benchmark. In our view, the first of these does not represent real losses, as 
a very activist policy with a large budget deficit could prevent a sharp general contraction, 
while a policy of doing nothing would result in a protracted downturn. Fiscal costs are clearly 
lower in the second instance, but real losses could very well be higher.
12 
For this reason, following the work of Barro (2001), Bordo et al (2001) and Hoggarth, Reis 
and Saporta (2001), we use output costs as the measure of the real costs of a financial 
crisis. Rather than constructing a counterfactual for the evolution of GDP in the absence of 
the crisis, we define the contraction as the period over which output is below its pre-crisis 
level. The length of the contraction is defined as the number of quarters it takes for output to 
recover to its pre-crisis level, and depth is defined as the peak to trough percentage decline 
in GDP.
13 In addition, we measure the cumulative loss in GDP over the length of the crisis, 
taken as a fraction of its peak (pre-crisis) level. 
Characterising a crisis 
Table 2 reports estimates of the costs of the 40 crises in our sample, together with some 
summary statistics. Graph 6 collates the same information in a series of histograms to give 
an idea of the distribution on the costs. The median length of a crisis-related contraction is 
8.5 quarters, median depth nearly 6.6 per cent of the pre-crisis GDP peak and median loss 
(relative to peak) is 9.2 per cent of GDP.
14 
11 To check robustness, we replicated all computations assuming the current crisis started in August 2007 in all countries. The 
results are very similar except where indicated in the text. 
12 This discussion does not mean that fiscal costs are not interesting in their own right, merely that they are not a good proxy 
for the real losses arising from a financial crisis. See eg Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009). 
13 The pre-crisis GDP level is measured as the peak GDP level within one year either side of the crisis date. The length of the 
crisis-related contraction is measured starting in the quarter of the peak GDP level. 
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Graph 6 
Measures of crisis cost 
Length
1 Depth







15  15  15 
12  12 
9  9 
6  6 
3  3 
0  0 
3  9  15  21  27  33  3  9  15 21 27 33 39 45 
1 In quarters; number of quarters until real GDP reverts to the peak, which is defined by using a four-quarter window before and after the 
crisis to screen out the maximum value in that time frame. The onset of crises is as in Laeven and Valencia (2008), see also Table 2.   
2 
In per cent; peak to trough decline in real GDP. 
3 Summation of deviations in real GDP in each quarter (from the peak described in 
note 1), as a percentage of peak GDP. 
Source: Own calculations. 
But there is a tremendous diversity in all these measures. In fact, several of the crises were 
associated with no downturn whatsoever (Bolivia 1994, Colombia 1982, Nicaragua 2000, 
Paraguay 1995, Sri Lanka 1989 and Vietnam 1997), and several others were associated with 
contractions similar in magnitude to those arising from ordinary recessions. At the other 
extreme, a small number of crises were both extraordinarily protracted and deep. Bulgarian 
real GDP fell 42% in the mid-1990s and took almost seven years to recover to its pre-crisis 
level. Admittedly, financial disruptions were probably not the only factor explaining that 
dramatic drop in output, and it is hard to disentangle their impact from the concurrent political 
crisis and the collapse of the socialist economy. There are also issues with the measurement 
of GDP in transition economies. However, sharp drops in output of more than 10 percentage 
points, well beyond what is observed in normal business cycles, were also experienced in 
other economies in crisis, for example in Argentina (1980, 1989 and 2001), Brazil (1990), 
Chile (1981), Croatia (1998), Estonia (1991), Finland (1991), Ghana (1982), Indonesia 
(1997), Latvia (1995), Malaysia (1997), Mexico (1994), Thailand (1997) and Uruguay 
(2002).
15 
4. Determining the size and length of the contraction 
The diversity of past crises means that averaging them to obtain an unconditional estimate of 
the likely impact of current events could be very misleading. But instead of seeing variation 
–52  –44  –36  –28  –20  –12  –4 
14 We note that the length, depth and cumulative loss have a correlation between 0.7 (length and depth) and 0.9 (depth and 
cumulative loss). 
15 This is consistent with the results of Claessens et al (2008) and IMF (2009), who find that recessions coinciding with 
financial crises tend to be deeper than those that do not.  
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as a curse, we can view it as an opportunity – by using the divergence across episodes to try 
to understand the determinants of the length and cost of the contraction following crises 
using conditional models. The hope is for a better understanding of the likely length and 
severity of the current contraction. 
We attempt to exploit the variation across past crises in two ways: first, creating a 
comparison group of similar crises that could provide deeper information on how current 
events are likely to work out, and second, estimating how particular conditions affect the real 
impact of the crisis. These exercises require the collection of additional information on factors 
that could influence the real costs of a crisis. 
4.1 Possible determinants 
Direct testing of the transmission channels identified in section 2 would require a fully 
specified model of the economy and the financial system. Instead we take a reduced-form 
approach in which we collect data grouped into six categories:
16 
(1)  country characteristics: GDP per capita and financial depth; 
(2)  crisis characteristics: whether the crisis was accompanied by a currency or sovereign 
debt crisis, GDP, credit, money growth, and the real interest rate preceding the crisis; 
(3)  the existence of a boom in the run-up to the crisis, as measured by GDP, credit, 
money, the real and nominal interest rate, equity prices and property prices; 
(4)  macroeconomic vulnerabilities, including the outstanding level of government debt 
and the fiscal balance, the current account, the net stock of foreign assets, and the 
deviation of the real exchange rate from its long-term average; 
(5)  the nature of response during the crisis, including deposit freezes and guarantees, 
bank mergers, nationalisations and closures;  
(6)  external conditions in the years after the start of the crisis, such as growth in the rest 
of the world, trading partner growth (this will capture changes in trade that are driven 
by changes in external demand), equity volatility, global risk aversion, and the 
presence of crises elsewhere.  
In the absence of a single coherent theory that links the financial system to the real 
economy, we chose a set of variables that could plausibly influence the real output costs of a 
crisis. Many of these variables have already been used in the literature on early warning 
models,
17 although there are some differences: early warning models require indicators to be 
16  A list of the individual variables is given in the Appendix in Table A.1. 
17  Recent contributions are Demirgüc-Kunt, Detragiache and Gupta (2006) and Rose and Spiegel (2009). 
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available well before the onset of a crisis. As we do not have this requirement, not all of our 
variables are predetermined – for example, the policy response or external conditions clearly 
are not – but they are likely to have an impact on the severity of the contraction associated 
with a crisis. 
We employ these various crisis characteristics in two ways: cluster analysis to identify 
historical episodes that can provide some insights into current events and regression 
analysis to obtain predictions for the current crisis.  
4.2 Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis allows us to assign sets of observations to subsets that are similar, given a 
set of characteristics. Apart from the choice of the characteristics, however, the technique 
allows the investigator to remain agnostic. It groups observations into clusters by minimising 
differences within clusters and maximising differences across clusters. Cluster analysis is 
widely used in quantitative social research to analyse datasets with a large number of 
variables. For example, it allows firms to group clients that may be receptive to particular 
ways of marketing, and it helps authorities sort through immigration files in their hunt for 
terrorists.
18 
The results of the cluster analysis are represented in a dendrogramme (Graph 7).
19 To 
compare crises on a large number of dimensions, a reduced dataset of 28 crises was chosen 
in addition to the eight countries analysed for the current crisis (the names of those eight are 
capitalised in the graph). The graph shows the Euclidian distance (a measure of dissimilarity 
with respect to all variables) between the crises along the horizontal axis; the country and 
year of crisis is on the vertical axis. If the Euclidian distance between two observations is 
below a given threshold level on the horizontal axis – that is they are more similar than the 
level of dissimilarity we allow – they are joined in a cluster. Observations with distances 
above the threshold remain separate. Thus, in general, each observation would form its own 
cluster if the threshold distance is set at zero, and all observations would fall into one cluster 
if the threshold is set to be sufficiently large.  
In Graph 7 we can identify several crises that are fairly similar to each other. The closest are 
those of Malaysia (1997) and Korea (1997). If the threshold distance is increased, these are 
joined by Thailand (1997) and Indonesia (1997). The cluster analysis also groups the 
Swedish (1991) and Finnish (1991) crises early on. By contrast, the Norwegian (1991) crisis 
18 Applications in economics include Artis and Zhang (2001), Kok Sorensen and Puigvert Gutiérrez (2006) and Marsh and 
Stevens (2003). A textbook treatment can be found in Tan, Steinbach and Kumar (2006). 
19 In the version of cluster analysis we use, we compute the similarity of the crises in our dataset by computing the sum of the 
Euclidean distances between the possible determinants listed in Table A.1. To account for the fact that there are fewer 
variables in some groups than in others, we weigh each group equally. Data availability means that not all variables are 
included in this part of the analysis. 
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is only slightly less distant from the two contemporaneous Nordic crises than it is from the 
various Asian crises. 
One of the most striking conclusions we draw from this way of looking at the data is that 
current events are unique. While some of the countries suffering from the current crisis 
cluster fairly close together – Germany and the Netherlands appear close – they are very 
dissimilar from all other episodes.
20 In fact, the cluster analysis joins the current crises only 
after almost all previous crises have joined. The implication is that the current crisis is less 
similar to all of the crises in our database than, say, the Japanese financial crisis of the 
1990s is to the crisis experienced by Ecuador in 1998 or than it is to the crisis that occurred 
in Bulgaria during the transition!  
The uniqueness of the current crisis is an important, if discouraging, result. It suggests that 
using simple comparisons with a selected group of previous crises, as done by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008b), for example, is unlikely to produce better results than simply averaging 
across all previous episodes. There simply does not appear to be a good control group with 
which current events can be compared. 
20 The United Kingdom has the largest distance from any other crises in the sample because of its high level of financial depth. 
Since the measures of Euclidean distance used in the analysis are sensitive to very large numbers, countries with high 
values of some variables tend to be shown as outliers. In fact, the  United Kingdom clusters close to the  United States if the 
financial depth variable is dropped. 
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4.3 Econometric analysis 
Can we predict the length and depth of the current crisis given historical experiences? The 
analysis in the previous sections suggests that crises are very dissimilar and that the current 
financial crisis is especially different from those that have come before it. As a result, it is 
difficult to use (unconditional) average past experience to draw conclusions about how deep 
and long the current contraction of the real economy is likely to be. That said, if we can 
identify several key drivers of the length, depth and cumulative output loss of past 
contractions following financial crises, then we can use this information to predict the likely 
real impact of the current crisis. 
Our estimation strategy is as follows: we begin by analysing the bivariate relationships 
between the depth, length and cumulative output losses of a contraction on the one hand 
and a long list of candidate drivers on the other. Next we turn to some simple multivariate 
regressions. Finally, we use the multivariate regression estimates to construct out-of-sample 
predictions for the severity of the current contraction.  
Table 3 shows the results of the bivariate regressions on the characteristics listed in Table 
A.1. Not surprisingly, given that crises are multifaceted phenomena that are not easily 
captured by one driver, many of the coefficients are small, or imprecisely estimated, or both. 
Nevertheless, a number of variables stand out. 
First, the level of economic and financial development, as measured by either per capita 
GDP or credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, have little correlation with any of 
the measures of output loss. In other words, the length, depth and cumulative output losses 
of the contractions associated with financial crises appear to be unaffected by whether a 
country is rich or poor or whether it has a small or large financial sector. 
In contrast, crisis characteristics do seem to matter. For example, a country that also faces a 
currency crisis has, on average, a longer and deeper contraction (by six quarters and 6 per 
cent of GDP at the trough, respectively).
21 Furthermore, high growth immediately prior to the 
onset of a crisis is associated with shorter and shallower contractions. A country that has 1 
percentage point higher GDP growth in the year before the crisis has a shorter and shallower 
contraction (by one quarter and 0.5 per cent of GDP, respectively). This result confirms our 
belief that recession-induced systemic crises have higher output costs than those crises 
beginning when the economy is growing at a relatively high rate.
22 
21 This contrasts with results by Hutchison and Noy (2005), who find no evidence for an additional feedback between currency 
and banking crises. 
22 We get a similar, albeit less precise, result when looking at average GDP growth during the three years preceding the crisis. 
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The evidence on the importance of boom-bust cycles is mixed. Among the variables 
capturing a boom, the credit gap and the money gap stand out. While a crisis following a 
credit boom does appear to have larger output costs, it is not by much – our estimates 
suggestion that a one standard deviation (17 percentage points) higher credit or money gap 
increases the length of a crisis by less than 2 quarters.  
Table 3: Explanatory variables’ bivariate regressions 
Length  Depth  Cumulative loss relative to 
peak
1 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Country characteristics 
GDP p.c.  0.214 0.39  –0.030  0.87 0.224 0.64 
Credit-to-GDP  0.056 0.08* 0.017 0.47 -0.097 0.21 
Crisis characteristics 
Curr. Crisis  6.44  0.03**  6.27  0.02**  –13.57 0.14 
Sov. Debt Crisis  –3.60 0.18 –3.35 0.25 11.18 0.11 
∆GDP(-1)  –0.990  0.00***  –0.687  0.00***  2.972  0.00*** 
∆Credit(-1)  0.014 0.08*  –0.006 0.45 0.003 0.90 
∆M(-1)  0.047  0.32 –0.043 0.29 –0.048 0.66 
r(-1)  –0.052 0.31 –0.074  0.03**  0.192 0.06* 
Boom 
∆GDP(-3)  –0.770  0.03**  –0.595 0.10*  2.473  0.10* 
∆Credit(-3)  –0.003 0.91 –0.038 0.29  0.103  0.40 
∆M(-3)  –0.026 0.72 –0.049 0.60  0.182  0.52 
r(-3)  0.021 0.80  –0.075  0.17 0.192 0.28 
i(-3)  0.043 0.60 0.139 0.33  –0.438  0.35 
Creditgap(-1)  0.088  0.02**  0.078  0.04**  –0.239  0.03** 
Moneygap(-1)  0.076  0.02**  0.075  0.01***  –0.188  0.00*** 
Stockprice(-3)
2  –0.075 0.35 –0.004 0.95  0.017  0.94 
Houseprice(-3)
 2  0.401 0.43 0.148 0.63  –0.124  0.89 
Stockgap(-1)
 2  –0.158  0.04**  –0.036 0.47  0.190  0.13 
Housegap(-1)
 2  –0.314 0.72 –0.093 0.83  1.236  0.43 
Vulnerabilites 
Gov.debt
2  –0.025 0.56 –0.009 0.86 –0.046 0.78 
Fiscal Balance  0.618  0.04** 0.255  0.35 –1.438 0.18 
Current Account  0.366 0.06* 0.234 0.28 –0.666 0.23 
Net Foreign 
Assets_CB  0.086 0.28 0.100 0.16  –0.371  0.20 
REER gap  0.069  0.00***  0.029  0.28 –0.096 0.22 
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Table 3: Explanatory variables’ bivariate regressions (cont’d) 
Policy response 
Deposit Freeze  0.286 0.91 2.773 0.18 1.482 0.82 
Bank Holiday  1.833 0.44 2.591 0.25  –1.641  0.80 
Blanket Guarantee   3.905 0.18 0.035 0.99 1.907 0.80 
Liquidity Support  5.000 0.07* 3.238 0.24  –14.667  0.03** 
Liq. Support (in %)  0.011 0.59 0.030 0.10  –0.069  0.35 
Forbearance          2.524 0.36 2.399 0.34  –13.528  0.05** 
Government 
Intervention  4.833  0.01***  0.618 0.81  –12.242  0.04** 
Bank Closures
2  0.092 0.42 0.257 0.12  –0.676  0.20 
Bank Nationalisation  7.054  0.01***  5.055  0.06*  –16.143  0.05** 
Bank Mergers
2  4.583 0.11 1.162 0.72  –3.395  0.74 
Sales to Foreigners
2  3.586 0.23 1.437 0.63  –5.536  0.59 
Bank Restructuring
2  3.263 0.25  –0.046  0.98 3.512 0.64 
Asset Management 
Company  4.333 0.12 1.140 0.67  –9.329  0.26 
Recap. costs
2  0.306  0.02**  0.288  0.02**  –0.672 0.16 
External conditions 
∆Trading 
PartnerGDP(+3)  –0.514  0.78  –1.941  0.13  4.245  0.26 
∆WorldGDP(+3)  –2.903 0.18 –1.939  0.10* 6.659  0.12 
Risk Aversion 
Index(+3)
 2  –0.548 0.45 –0.489 0.55  1.657  0.42 
VIX (+3)
 2  –0.116 0.76 –0.079 0.80  0.830  0.52 
No.CrisesWorld  –0.102 0.53 –0.012 0.93  0.009  0.98 
No. CrisesRegion  –0.612 0.16 –0.058 0.88  0.074  0.95 
1 Losses are defined as negative, so a positive coefficient implies lower output losses. 
2 These variables were excluded from the 
cluster analysis and the multivariate regressions because of the low number of observations; see Appendix, Table A.2. All 
variables as defined in the Appendix, Table A.1 
Next, we find that countries exhibiting traditional vulnerabilities such as a high level of the 
real exchange rate (relative to trend) have a tendency to have longer – but not necessarily 
deeper – contractions following financial crises.
23 
Turning to policy, the results confirm that severe crises are associated with stronger 
responses. For example, bank nationalisations and larger government-financed 
recapitalisations are accompanied by longer and more costly contractions. This surely 
23 The level of the fiscal balance relative to GDP appears also to be statistically significantly related to the length of the 
contraction, but the relationship has an economically counter-intuitive sign: a higher surplus position at the beginning of the 
crisis is related to a longer contraction. This result carries over to the multivariate regression reported below where the fiscal 
position is found to be significant at the 90 per cent level in explaining length, but with a positive coefficient. However, the 
coefficient is small, with a one per cent higher surplus implying a contraction that is longer by less than one month. We have 
therefore not included this variable in our preferred specification.  
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reflects the fact that these policy responses are both dramatic and likely to occur only when 
the fallout from the crisis is already severe. For the same reasons, a variety of other 
government interventions – liquidity support, forbearance, deposit freezes and bank holidays 
– are associated with more severe recessions that lead to higher output losses. 
Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, external conditions do not seem to be related to 
economic performance following a crisis. However, this may reflect the limited cross-
sectional variation in these variables as much as a lack of influence of these factors. None of 
the crises in our sample coincided with a worldwide slowdown in growth and trade volumes 
that came close to what we have witnessed in the current episode. 
Bivariate correlations are clearly incapable of providing us with a full, conclusive picture of 
the factors that are most likely to influence real growth in the aftermath of a financial crisis. 
With this in mind, we construct a multivariate model for the three measures of crisis severity 
– length, depth and cumulative output loss – using 31 of the 44 candidate variables in 
Table 2 (the table notes the 13 variables excluded). The vast number of possible models, 
combined with a lack of theoretical guidance, means that we have inevitably exercised 
judgment in arriving at a parsimonious, economically meaningful model.
24 
Table 4 reports our preferred model. These are specifications that are robust across different 
sample sizes and specifications. Looking at the included variables and their coefficients, we 
see that the results are largely in line with those of the bivariate regressions. The length of 
the contraction following systemic banking crises is strongly related to the following variables: 
• the growth of GDP in the year before the crisis (higher growth implies a shorter 
contraction); 
• the presence of a currency crisis (longer by more than five quarters, on average);  
• the presence of  a sovereign debt crisis (shorter by more than seven quarters, on 
average); 
• whether an asset management company has been set up (longer  by more than five 
quarters). 
The association of a sovereign debt crisis with a shorter contraction may seem surprising at 
first, but it is quite robust:
25 most of the crises in our sample that were associated with a 
24 We also experimented with principal components to summarise the information content of the variables belonging to a 
particular variable group. However, it turned out that the number of principal components required to explain a satisfactory 
fraction of the variation in the underlying variables was quite large and that the fit of the regressions using principal 
components was rather low. 
25 We note that this result is not a consequence of the interaction of currency crises with sovereign debt crises. Either 
coefficient remains significantly different from zero when the other variable is dropped. 
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sovereign debt crisis
26 were both short and shallow. The reason is that in many crises 
significant amounts of debt were held by foreigners, so a sovereign default freed up 
resources that could be used domestically rather than being transferred abroad. Given that 
the current crisis is centred in advanced economies, where a substantial fraction of 
government debt is held internally, this finding is of little practical importance today. 
Turning to the depth of the contraction, it is strongly related to whether it was accompanied 
by a currency crisis (6 percentage points more GDP loss at its worst point) or a sovereign 
debt crisis (7 percentage points shallower) and to the GDP growth in the year preceding the 
crisis (lower growth implies a deeper contraction). 
Finally, looking at our preferred model for the cumulative output loss, we note that this overall 
measure of cost is most closely related to whether a crisis was accompanied by a sovereign 
debt crisis (25 percentage points lower loss) and whether GDP growth was higher in the year 
preceding the crisis. Both these variables are likely to reflect their importance already seen 
for the length and depth of the contraction. Regulatory forbearance was also associated with 
higher cumulative losses. 
Table 4: Multivariate models for cost of crisis (preferred models) 
 Dependent  variable 
Explanatory variable  Length  Depth  Cumulative output 
loss 
Constant  5.79  (0.00)  6.34  (0.00)  –12.82  (0.00) 
Curr. Crisis  5.63  (0.00)  6.00  (0.02) 
Sov. Debt Crisis  –7.58  (0.02)  –6.93   (0.01)  24.98  (0.00) 
∆GDP(–1)  –1.00  (0.00)  –0.70  (0.00)  3.14  (0.00) 
Asset Management  5.60  (0.00) 
Company 
Forbearance  –14.14  (0.03) 
Adjusted R
2 0.67  0.31  0.41 
No. of observations  39  39  39 
Numbers in brackets are p-values, based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. Variables 
as defined in the Appendix, Table A.1. 
Overall, these three models fit the diverse crisis experiences reasonably well, explaining 
between 30 and 70 per cent of the variation in the depth and length data respectively. Given 
this, we use these models to produce predicted values of real output losses for a number of 
countries in the current crisis (see Table A3 in the Appendix for a list of these countries and 
26  Argentina (2001), Dominican Republic (2003), Ecuador (1998), Russia (1998) and Sri Lanka (1989).  
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the values of the explanatory variables). As a robustness check, we include a variant of the 
model for length and output loss that includes depth.
27 Assuming that the trough of the 
contraction in the current crisis has already been reached, we can now produce a set of 
predicted values for the length of the current crisis and output losses that will be associated 
with it for each of the eight countries we selected to assess the current crisis. 
Graph 8 
Predicted real output costs of current crisis for selected countries 
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CH = Switzerland; DE = Germany; ES = Spain; GB = United Kingdom; IE = Ireland; JP = Japan; NL = Netherlands; US = United States. 
Predictions for current crisis using preferred model and preferred model including depth; with 90% confidence intervals. 
Graph 8 reports point estimates (the dots) and 90 per cent confidence bands (the lines) for 
our forecasts of the length, depth and cumulative cost going forward. The estimates are very 
imprecise. In fact, for some countries the confidence bands imply that we are unable to reject 
the hypothesis that the length of the downturn will be zero – even though this is clearly not 
how things have turned out. With this caveat in mind, we note that the mean prediction for 
the length of the current crisis is that it will be about 10 quarters long. Adding the assumption 
that the trough has already been reached does not alter this conclusion by much. For 
example, our point estimates suggest for the United States and the United Kingdom to regain 
27 The model estimates are in the Appendix, Table A.4; in all models, depth is significantly different from zero at the 99 per 
cent confidence level. 
US GB ES  JP  DE CH  IE  NL  US GB ES  JP  DE CH  IE  NL 
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their pre-contraction level of output by the second half of 2010 (note that the length of the 
contraction is measured from the peak-level of GDP around the crisis, which is the second 
quarter of 2008 for the US and the first quarter of 2008 for the UK). Our model predicts that 
Spain and the Netherlands reach their pre-contraction level of output a couple of quarters 
later, while Japan and Ireland would rebound earlier (in the latter case, this is partly because 
Ireland’s GDP started falling before that of the other countries). Of course, the error bands 
around these point estimates exceed easily one to two years.  
The depth of the crisis-induced downturn will – according to the model – be around 5 per 
cent of peak-level GDP. But again, the 90 per cent confidence interval around this estimate 
ranges from zero to 20 per cent. Predicted cumulative output losses are around 20 per cent 
of peak-level GDP, but as before, the error bands are very wide. 
For this prediction exercise, we have chosen the start of the crisis in each economy 
according to the criteria employed by Leuven and Valencia for the past crises in our dataset. 
However, our estimates of the length and severity of the current crisis are somewhat 
sensitive to the exact choice of the starting date. As an alternative, we have therefore 
analysed the case where we assume the current episode to have started in August 2007 
everywhere. Making this change yields results similar to those reported above, with one 
caveat. In those countries where, according to Leuven and Valencia’s criteria, the crisis 
started later this change leads to the prediction that the crisis will be shorter (this is driven by 
the onset of the global slowdown after August 2007). The results for Spain and Ireland are 
most affected, with a predicted length that is 2-3 quarters shorter, depth that is around 2 
percentage points shallower, and cumulated output losses that are accordingly lower. 
5.  What are the long-term consequences of crises for real output? 
The question that is most difficult to answer – but perhaps also one of the most interesting – 
is whether systemic banking crises have long-term effects on the level of real output, its 
trend, or both. Given the role of potential output and estimates of the output gap in modern 
macroeconomic policy, this is an issue of very clear importance. 
A number of factors might cause financial crises to have a long-run impact on economic 
activity. High on the list is the rise in the cost of capital that could come from increases in 
longer-term risk-free real interest rates, rising actual and expected inflation and higher risk 
aversion. Traditional crowding out might lead to higher longer-term risk-free real interest 
rates following the sharp increases in government debt arising from the combination of fiscal 
stimulus and support for the banking system. Actual and expected inflation could rise 
because of the inflationary impact of central bank balance sheet expansion and the 
overestimation of the size of the output gap. And, more structurally, the higher equity risk 
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premia resulting from a re-assessment of risk and increased risk aversion could lead to lower 
capital accumulation in the long run. In addition, reduced leverage and slower financial 
innovation may prevent financing for projects that otherwise would have added to productivity 
growth. Finally, a possible reversal of financial globalization may reduce growth by inhibiting 
trade and development, although the literature (Kose et al (2009), Rodrik (2009)) has so far 
had difficulties finding an impact of financial integration on growth.
28 
The empirical challenge of measuring the impact of systemic banking crises on growth is at 
least as large as the theoretical one. Addressing the empirical question requires computing 
what the economic growth rate would have been in the absence of a systemic crisis. The 
accuracy of frequently used statistical methods – such as Hodrick-Prescott filtered trends – 
relies on the availability of relatively long time series. Obviously, the presence of structural 
breaks, such as those that might be created by systemic crises, poses significant difficulties. 
Temporarily lower growth immediately after a crisis as well as the higher growth rates during 
the recovery period will probably distort estimates for trend growth for many years after the 
crisis. Excluding the crisis data might appear to offer a solution, but since the length of the 
resulting contraction is usually not well defined, and sufficient data thereafter have to be 
available, it is impractical. 
That said, we use a very simple approach to examine whether a longer-term change in GDP 
usually occurs after systemic crises and to estimate whether there is a break in the level 
and/or the trend of the log of GDP.
29 The equation is of the following form:
 30 
~ ~ ln y = α + αD + βt + βD t + ε with D = 0 if t < crisis date and D = 1 if t ≥ crisis date t t t t t t
where the crisis date is the beginning of the crisis.   
We note that Quandt-Andrews (Andrews 1993) tests used to date the most likely break 
points find that only about half of the crisis periods are associated with breaks in GDP level 
28 The empirical literature has yielded mixed evidence as to whether financial crises affect output in the long term. Using a 
growth model with crisis dummies, Barro (2001) finds that crises do generally not affect output growth 5 years later. 
However, this also means that output lost during a crisis may never be recovered. The estimates of Furceri and 
Mourougane (2009) suggest that crises lower future potential output by roughly 2 percentage points on average. Ramírez 
(2008) shows that states more affected by the US banking crisis of 1893 grew more slowly over the following decades than 
other states 
29 An alternative approach is to use estimates for potential output based on production functions (see Furceri and Mourougane 
2009), but this is very data intensive, making it unfeasible to study more than a small number of crises.  
30 ADF tests indicate that the residuals of this equation are stationary for most of the cases, even though we have relatively 
short sample periods for many countries. We also estimated our model in first differences; this allows us to test only for a 
break in the trend growth rate of GDP. The results are very similar to those in the model that allows for a break in both trend 
and level (see Appendix, Graph A.1). 
17/09/2009 10:04:21  23    






   
         
       





                                                       




    
 
Cecchetti, Kohler and Upper  Financial Crises and Economic Activity September 2009 
or trend (or both).
31 The estimated break dates are usually within one to two years of the 
beginning of the crisis. 
Graph 9
Size of the structural breaks 
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AR = Argentina; BG = Bulgaria; BO = Bolivia; BR = Brazil; CI = Côte d’Ivoire; CL = Chile; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; 
DO = Dominican Republic; EC = Ecuador; EE = Estonia; FI = Finland; GH = Ghana; HR = Croatia; ID = Indonesia; JM = Jamaica; 
JP = Japan; KR = Korea; LK = Sri Lanka; LT = Lithuania; LV = Latvia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; NI = Nicaragua; NO = Norway; 
PH  = Philippines; PY = Paraguay; RU = Russia; SE = Sweden; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey; UA = Ukraine; UY  =  Uruguay; 
VE = Venezuela; VN = Vietnam. Crisis dates are as in Table 2, except Q1 1985 for Argentina, Q4 1981 for Chile and Q1 1986 for 
Ghana, which had to be changed from the official crisis dates since time series of sufficient length to test for breaks at the official dates 
were not available. The coefficient estimates are marked with dots and the 90% confidence intervals with lines. 
~ ~ Graph 9 shows the results of the estimates α and  β (the estimated breaks in the level and 
trend) with 90 per cent confidence intervals.
32 The results show that more than half of the 
countries experienced a negative shift in the level of GDP, although this is only significant in 
one fifth of cases overall. The estimated trend growth rates tend to be higher after the crisis, 
but this is significant in only about half of the cases. In eight cases we find lower trend growth 
rates, and in most of these – including Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Japan –  the crisis 
is also associated with a decline in the level of GDP. Consistent with our earlier evidence that 
31 We applied the Quandt-Andrews test for unknown breakpoints, with a trimming of 15%. This method yielded breakpoints for 
almost every country included; a number of these were well outside (and therefore likely unrelated to) any crisis period. A 
Chow test for known break points suggests that all 40 crises coincide with a break in the level and trend of GDP, but some 
of these results are likely to reflect other break points of GDP that are unaccounted for in this simpler test. For details, see 
the Appendix, Table A.5. 
32 The estimated break in the constant is adjusted to reflect the estimated change in the level of GDP at the beginning of the 
crisis. The level break at the beginning of the crisis is equal to the estimated break in the constant plus γ times the estimated 
change in the slope, where γ is the time period when the crisis begins (t=0 at the first available observation). 
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the crisis experience varies substantially across countries, a number of countries show 
positive, significant breaks in both the level and trend of GDP around systemic crises. 
Including the contraction period in the assessment of changes in longer-run level and trend 
of GDP growth, as we have done so far, could bias our estimates.
33 To check whether this is 
a problem, we have analysed two alternatives: one in which the post-crisis period starts after 
the contraction (as we define it) has ended and one where the post-crisis period starts 
(arbitrarily) three years after the beginning of the crisis (see Appendix, Graph A.2). The 
results for the sign and size of the breaks in trend and level are very similar to those reported 
above: many countries have insignificant changes in level or trend of GDP; of those that are 
significant, a number show falls in the long-run level of GDP and positive significant changes 
in the level. 
Graph 10
Time to recover from crisis-related changes in GDP 
Number of quarters 
3 
8  9  13  15  16  16  17  18  20  24 
35 





PH  CZ AR1 RU AR2 BG  LT  UA  TR  EC  DO  LK  EE  UY  SE  VE  CO  FI 
AR = Argentina (AR1 for Q1 1985 and AR2 for Q4 2001); BG = Bulgaria; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; DO = Dominican 
Republic; EC = Ecuador; EE = Estonia; FI = Finland; LK = Sri Lanka; LT = Lithuania; PH = Philippines; RU = Russia; SE = Sweden; TR = 
Turkey; UA = Ukraine; UY = Uruguay; VE = Venezuela. Crisis dates are as in Table 2, except Q1 1985 for Argentina. 
Overall, these results suggest that around the time of a financial crisis, a number of countries 
experienced a large drop in GDP followed by a longer period of faster GDP growth. But this 
way of stating the case may paint an overly optimistic picture of a crisis-induced contraction 
and recovery, since the drops in the level of output may outweigh the faster growth that 
follows. To assess this issue, we have made a simple computation of the time it takes at the 
higher post-crisis growth rate to return to the level of GDP implied by the lower pre-crisis 
growth rate (in the absence of a crisis). Graph 10 shows these results. Even if we exclude 
the crises in Venezuela, Colombia and Finland, it takes 22 quarters on average for the higher 
GDP growth rate to compensate for the drop in level.
34 
33  In most cases, the estimate of the level would be more negative and the estimate of the trend more positive. 
34  This graph includes only the 18 crises where the economy experienced both a drop in the level and a rise in the trend 
growth rate. In 16 cases, countries had a positive shift in the level and in 6 cases countries had a negative shift in both the 
level and the trend. 
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6. Conclusion 
Financial crises are more frequent than most people think, and they lead to losses that are 
much larger than one would hope. On average, there have been between three and four 
systemic banking crises per year for the past quarter century.
35 Not all of these have had 
visible real costs, but most have. In the restricted sample of 40 financial crises that we study, 
fully one fourth resulted in cumulative output losses of more than 25 per cent of pre-crisis 
GDP. And one third of the crisis-related contractions lasted for three years or more.  
Banking crises are also quite diverse. In fact, those that we study appear to be practically 
unique in their evolution. In an important sense, the average crisis does not exist. 
Nevertheless, by directing a battery of statistical tools at the historical data, we are able to 
use the variation across crises to learn a number of things that can provide insights into the 
likely progression of the current crisis. We find that when a banking crisis is accompanied by 
a currency crisis, it is more than five quarters longer, and the trough in output is (on average) 
6 percentage points lower. And when it comes along with a sovereign debt default, the 
financial crisis is less severe – nearly two years shorter and 7 percentage points of pre-crisis 
GDP less deep. Furthermore, we show that if the crisis is preceded by low growth – possibly 
because it is induced by a recession – it tends to be more severe. For each percentage point 
that GDP growth is lower, the contraction is longer by one quarter and the trough in activity is 
1 percentage point lower.  
By altering attitudes towards risk, as well as increasing the level of government debt and the 
size of central banks’ balance sheets, systemic crises have the potential to raise real and 
nominal interest rates and consequently depress investment and lower the productive 
capacity of the economy in the long run. We looked for evidence of these effects and found 
that a number of crises had lasting, negative impacts on GDP. In some countries this was a 
result of an immediate, crisis-induced drop in the level of real output combined with a 
permanent decline in trend growth. In other cases, we find that the growth trend increased 
following the crisis but that the immediate drop was severe enough that it took years for the 
economy to make up for the crisis-related output loss. 
Finally, we were able to find a robust statistical model that can explain a large share of 
variation in contraction length across past crises. This model predicts that for the current 
episode, some of the main crisis-affected economies will return to their pre-crisis level of 
GDP by the second half of 2010. 
35 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, Table A3) identify 144 since 1980, while Laeven and Valencia (2008) list 124 over the same 
period. 
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Table A.1: Variables 
 Variable  Definition  Source 






II. Country characteristics 
GDP p.c. 
Credit-to-GDP 
III. Crisis characteristics 
Curr. Crisis 


















Length of contraction: number of quarters until GDP 
reverts to pre-crisis peak 
Depth of contraction: peak to trough decline in GDP 
Cumulative output loss of contraction: cumulative GDP 
decline during contraction 
GDP per capita (PPP) 
Financial depth: domestic credit to private sector as 
share of GDP, at four quarters before crisis  
Currency crisis: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Sovereign debt crisis: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Real GDP growth in the year before crisis (t–4 to t) 
Real private domestic credit growth in the year before 
crisis 
Real broad money growth in the year before crisis 
Real three-month interest rate, annualised, four-quarter 
average before crisis 
Real GDP growth, average annual change in the three 
years before crisis (t–12 to t) 
Real private domestic credit growth, average annual 
change in the three years before crisis 
Real broad money growth, average annual change in the 
three years before crisis 
Real three-month interest rate, annualised, 12-quarter 
average before crisis 
Nominal three-month interest rate, annualised, 12­
quarter average before crisis 
Real credit gap, defined as deviation from HP trend (in 
per cent), four-quarter average before crisis 
Real money gap, defined as deviation from HP trend (in 
per cent), four-quarter average before crisis 
Stock price increase, average annual change in the three 
years before crisis 
House price increase, average annual change in the 
three years before crisis 
Stock price gap, defined as deviation from HP trend (in 
per cent), four-quarter average before crisis 
House price gap, defined as deviation from HP trend (in 
per cent), 4-quarter-average before crisis 






Own calculations  
LV 
LV 
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
Own calculations  
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Table A.1: Variables (cont’d) 








VI. Policy response 

































Government debt to GDP, one year before crisis 
General government balance to GDP, one year before 
crisis 
Current account deficit/surplus to GDP, one year before 
crisis 
Net foreign assets held by central bank to M2 
Real effective exchange rate, defined as deviation from 
HP trend (in per cent), one year before crisis 
Deposit freeze: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Bank holiday: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Blanket guarantee: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Liquidity support: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Liquidity support: per cent of total assets of banking 
system 
Forbearance: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Large-scale government intervention in banks: 1 = yes, 
0 = no 
Bank closures: closed banks as % of total assets 
Bank nationalisation: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Bank mergers: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Sales to foreigners: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Bank restructuring agency: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Asset management company: 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Recapitalisation cost to government (gross) 
GDP growth in top 10 trading partners, weighted 
average, average annual change in three years after 
crisis 
World GDP growth, average annual change in three 
years after crisis 
Global risk aversion index, average during 12 quarters 
after crisis 
VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index), 
average during 12 quarters after crisis 
Number of crises in the world occuring in +/- four 
quarters 
Number of crises in same region occuring in +/- four 
quarters 
Own calculations or LV 
Own calculations or LV 
Own calculations or LV 

















consensus forecasts for 
current crisis 
Own calculations, 
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for variables 
Variable Units  OBS  Mean  Median  Std  dev 
I. Cost of crises 
Length  Quarters 40  11.4  8.5  8.9 
Depth  Per cent  40  8.6  6.6  8.7 
Cumulative output loss  Per cent  40  –18.4  –9.2  28.6 
II. Country characteristics 
GDP p.c.  US dollar (‘000)  40  6.99  5.67  5.52 
Credit-to-GDP  Per cent of GDP  38  47.5  29.0  39.7 
III. Crisis characteristics 
Curr. crisis  1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.6  1.0  0.5 
Sov. Debt crisis  1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.1  0.0  0.3 
∆GDP(-1) Per  cent 39  0.5  1.3  5.8 
∆Credit(-1)  Per cent 39  17.1  12.2  55.8 
∆M(-1)  Per cent  39  2.5  2.7  18.3 
r(-1) Per  cent  34  6.3  5.9  17.7 
IV. Boom 
∆GDP(-3)  Per cent  38  1.6  2.7  4.5 
∆Credit(-3) Per  cent 35  14.3  11.4  33.3 
∆M(-3)  Per cent  35  7.7  5.4  14.5 
r(-3) Per  cent  30  5.2  3.8  13.5 
R(-3) Per  cent  30  24.7  15.8  20.1 
Creditgap(-1) Per  cent  39  5.2  2.2  17.1 
Moneygap(-1) Per  cent 39  3.8  1.0  17.3 
Stockprice(-3)   Per cent  20  3.2  –0.3  21.7 
Houseprice(-3) Per  cent  5  0.5  –1.6  6.8 
Stockgap(-1) Per  cent 21  –1.7  –3.0  20.4 
Housegap(-1) Per  cent  5  –3.7  0.2  6.7 
V. Vulnerabilities 
Gov.debt  Per cent of GDP  32  46.3  30.0  40.0 
Fiscal Balance  Per cent of GDP  40  –2.0  –2.1  4.6 
Current Account  Per cent of GDP  39  –3.8  –3.0  5.0 
Net Foreign Assets_CB  Per cent of M2  40  18.2  19.1  19.1 
REER gap  Per cent  31  10.7  9.5  46.6 
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for variables (cont’d) 
Variable Units  OBS  Mean  Median  Std  dev 
VI. Policy response 
Deposit Freeze  1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.1  0.0  0.3 
Bank Holiday  1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.1  0.0  0.3 
Blanket Guarantee   1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.3  0.0  0.5 
Liquidity Support  1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.8  1.0  0.4 
Liq. Support (in %)  Per cent  40  28.3  15.1  50.1 
Forbearance          1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.7  1.0  0.5 
Government Intervention  1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.9  1.0  0.3 
Bank Closures  Per cent of total assets  37  8.7  2.0  11.9 
Bank Nationalisation  1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.6  1.0  0.5 
Bank Mergers       1 = yes, 0 = no  39  0.6  1.0  0.5 
Sales to Foreigners       1 = yes, 0 = no  35  0.5  1.0  0.5 
Bank Restructuring  1 = yes, 0 = no  38  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Asset Management Company     1 = yes, 0 = no  40  0.6  1.0  0.5 
Recap. costs  Per cent of GDP  31  8.0  4.3  9.7 
VII. External conditions 
∆Trading PartnerGDP(+3)  Per cent  40  2.5  2.6  0.9 
∆WorldGDP(+3) Per  cent 40  3.2  3.5  0.6 
Risk Aversion Index(+3) Index  36  4.7  4.1  1.6 
VIX (+3)  Index  36 21.8  22.9  4.6 
No.CrisesWorld Number  40  18.5  18.0  8.5 
No. CrisesRegion  Number  40  4.9  4.5  2.6 
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United States  08/2007  44119  164  0  0 2.8 7.1 9.2 2.7 2.7 6.7 5.9 1.0 4.1 1.6 2.4 
United Kingdom  08/2007  33819  551  0  0 2.7 8.8  10.5 1.2 2.6 8.1  10.6 1.6 5.0 1.7 3.2 
Spain  09/2008  30116  175  0  0 0.9 4.3 8.1 0.8 2.8  13.5  10.0 0.2 3.6 1.9 3.8 
Japan  09/2008  33573 100  0  0 -0.3 -2.9 -1.6  0.2 1.2  -0.6  -0.8 0.3 0.5 1.2 0.8 
Germany  08/2007  32454  112  0  0 2.4  -3.0 6.3 2.0 2.4  -0.8 3.9 1.1 2.8  -0.1 1.5 
Switzerland  10/2007  38953  168  0  0 3.9 7.0 1.6 1.9 3.7 6.9 3.9 0.5 1.4 3.9 0.8 
Ireland  09/2008 43414  193  0  0  0.1  5.8  -10.7  -0.1 3.7  13.1 8.7  -0.5 3.6 0.8  -7.8 














































































































































































































































































United States  08/2007  60.1  -2.6  -6.2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1  -0.2  -0.5 9 9 
United Kingdom  08/2007  43.0  -2.6  -3.6 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1  -1.5  -0.5 9 9 
Spain  09/2008 36.2  2.2  -10.1  0  0  0 1 1 0 0 1  -1.0  0.6 9 9 
Japan  09/2008  187.7  -2.5  4.8 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0  1.5  0.6 9 9 
Germany  08/2007  66.0  -1.5  6.1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1  -0.8  -0.5 9 9 
Switzerland  10/2007 47.5  1.7 14.5  0  0  0  1 1 1 0 1  -1.4  -0.7 9 9 
Ireland  09/2008 24.8  0.2  -5.4  0  0  1  1 1 1 1 0  -0.6  0.6 9 9 
Netherland  09/2008 45.9  0.3  6.1  0  0  0  1 1 1 1 1  -1.1  0.6 9 9 
Sources: IMF, authors’ estimates. 
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Table A.4: Adding depth as explanatory variable to preferred models 
Dependent variable 
Explanatory variable  Length  Cumulative output loss 
Constant  4.12  (0.00)  6.51  (0.13) 
Curr. Crisis  3.70  (0.01) 
Sov. Debt Crisis  –5.39  (0.01)  9.28  (0.10) 
∆GDP(-1)  –0.78  (0.00)  1.32  (0.02) 
Asset Management Company  5.08  (0.00) 
Forbearance  –7.61  (0.08) 
Depth  0.32  (0.00)  –2.47  (0.00) 
Adjusted R
2  0.73  0.86 
No. of observations  39  39 
Numbers in brackets are p-values, based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. 
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Table A.5: Dates of crisis and test for breaks 
Chow test for break at specified date
1  Quandt-Andrews test for break at 
unknown date
1
 Crisis  α β α and β Break  α β α and β
date
2  date 
Argentina 03/1980  9 9 9 Q1  1985  9 -- --
Argentina 12/1989  9 -- 9
Argentina 01/1995  9 9 9 Q1  1992  -- 9 --
Argentina 12/2001  -- -- 9 Q4  2001  -- -- 9
Bolivia
3 11/1994  9 9 9 Q2  1994  -- 9 --
Brazil 02/1990  9 9 9 Q1  1991  9 9 9
Brazil 12/1994  9 -- 9
Bulgaria 01/1996  9 -- 9 Q3  2003  -- 9 --
Chile 11/1981  -- 9 9
Colombia 07/1982  9 9 9
Colombia 06/1998  9 9 9 Q4  1998  9 9
4 --
Côte d'Ivoire
3 01/1988  -- -- 9
Croatia 03/1998  9 9 9 Q1  2000  -- 9 --
Czech Republic  01/1996  -- 9 9
Dominican Republic  04/2003  9 9 9 Q2  2003  9
5 -- 9
Ecuador
3 08/1998  9 -- 9
Estonia 11/1992  9 9 9 Q1  1992  9 9
6 --
Finland 09/1991  9 9 9 Q2  1991  9 9
7 --
Ghana
3 01/1982  9 9 9 Q1  1985  9 -- --
Indonesia 11/1997  9 9 9 Q2  1998  9 9 --
Jamaica
3 12/1996  9 9 9 Q1  1997  -- 9 --
Japan 11/1997  9 9 9 Q1  1998  -- 9 --
Korea 08/1997  9 9 9 Q1  1998  9 9
8 --
Latvia 04/1995  9 9 9
Lithuania 12/1995  9 -- 9
Malaysia 07/1997  9 9 9 Q2  1998  -- 9 --
Mexico 12/1994  -- 9 9 Q2  1997  -- 9 --
Nicaragua
3 08/2000  9 9 9
Norway 10/1991  9 9 9
Paraguay
3 05/1995  -- 9 9
Philippines 07/1997  9 9 9
Russia 08/1998  -- 9 9
Sri Lanka
3 01/1989  9 9 9
Sweden 09/1991  9 9 9 Q3  1991  9 -- --
Thailand 07/1997  9 9 9 Q1  1998  9 9
8 --
Turkey 11/2000  9 -- 9 Q1  2001  -- -- 9
Ukraine
3 01/1998  -- -- 9
Uruguay
3 01/2002  9 9 9 Q1  2002  9
9 -- 9
Venezuela 01/1994  -- -- --
Vietnam
3 07/1997  9 9 9
1 A ‘9’ indicates that the H0 of no break could be rejected at the 95% level; ‘--‘ indicates that the H0 could not be rejected. No 
entry in the Quandt-Andrews tests indicates that no break point in the vicinity of the crisis could be found; Quandt-Andrews 
tests were performed with 15% trimming.  
2 From Laeven and Valencia database; breakpoint tested changed to Q1 1985 in 
Argentina, Q4 1981 for Chile and Q1 1986 for Ghana since sufficient time series length to test for breaks prior to these were 
not available.    
3 Annual data are used due to limited availability of quarterly data; quarterly observations were interpolated 
where possible.  
4 Q3 1998.  
5 Q1 2003.     
6 Q4 2001.    
7 Q1 1991. 
8 Q4 1997.    
9 Q3 2001. 
Sources: Laeven and Valencia (2008); IMF; national data; BIS calculations. 
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Graph A.1
Size of the structural breaks  









MY TH  ID KR JP JM TR BR PY CO MX  FI  SE VN NO VE PH  LK EC CI DO BG BR AR3 CO CZ UY  NI BO EE HR AR4AR1 GH AR2 CL RU  LT UA LV 
Graph A.2
Size of the structural breaks  











Note: End of the contraction as defined in Table 2 “List of crisis”. 
AR = Argentina; BG = Bulgaria; BO = Bolivia; BR = Brazil; CI = Côte d’Ivoire; CL = Chile; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; 
DO = Dominican Republic; EC = Ecuador; EE = Estonia; FI = Finland; GH = Ghana; HR = Croatia; ID = Indonesia; JM = Jamaica; 
JP = Japan; KR = Korea; LK = Sri Lanka; LT = Lithuania; LV = Latvia; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; NI = Nicaragua; NO = Norway; 
PH  = Philippines; PY = Paraguay; RU = Russia; SE = Sweden; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey; UA = Ukraine; UY  =  Uruguay; 
VE = Venezuela; VN = Vietnam. Crisis dates are as in Table 2, except Q1 1985 for Argentina, Q4 1981 for Chile and Q1 1986 for 
Ghana, which had to be changed from the official crisis dates since time series of sufficient length to test for breaks at the official dates 
were not available. The coefficient estimates are marked with dots and the 90% confidence intervals with lines. 
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Dummy beginning contraction 
Dummy end contraction 
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